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The Spanish Civil WarRevolution and Counterrevolution$

Burnett Bolloten

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9781469624464

Published to North Carolina Scholarship Online: May 2016

DOI: 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469624464.001.0001

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Negrín’s Thirteen War Aims

Negrín’s Thirteen War Aims

(p.642) 60 Negrín’s Thirteen War Aims
The Spanish Civil War

Burnett Bolloten

University of North Carolina Press

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter examines Negrín's thirteen war aims program and the shockwaves it generated both at home and abroad. Issued on April 1938, the thirteen war aims soon became the programmatic frontispiece of the Negrín government. However, many found its claims dubious—as the previous chapters have shown, the PCE's actions ran counter to the aims listed in the program, though the program in and of itself was not dismissed entirely, even by the CNT. The thirteen aims were regarded as propaganda, and as a means to effect a change in international policy toward antifacist Spain. The thirteen-point program then, seemed futile in that light, for any hopes that the rest of Europe would somehow save Republican Spain were dashed as General Franco launched an attack against Catalonia in December 1938.

Keywords:   Negrín government, thirteen war aims, propaganda, international policy, Republican Spain, European conflict

In a move designed to influence the Western democracies and the moderate segment in General Franco’s territory, the government issued on 30 April 1938 the following statement to Spanish and foreign journalists:

The Government of National Union, which enjoys the confidence of all parties and trade-union organizations in Loyalist Spain … solemnly proclaims for the knowledge of its compatriots and for the information of the world the following war aims:

  1. 1. To assure the absolute independence and complete integrity of Spain, a Spain completely free from all foreign interference whatever its nature and origin …

  2. 2. Liberation of our territory from the foreign military forces that have invaded it, as well as from those elements who have come to Spain since July 1936 and who, under the pretext of technical collaboration, intervene and attempt to dominate the legal and economic life of Spain for their own benefit. [To avoid misunderstanding, the Communist organ Mundo Obrero made it clear that this paragraph was directed at German and Italian military forces and technicians and at those “who have been placed at the head of all kinds of foreign industrial enterprises established by the invaders in the rebel zone.”1]

  3. 3. A People’s Republic represented by a strong State based on principles of pure democracy and acting through a government endowed with full authority by the votes of its citizens enjoying universal suffrage

  4. 4. The legal and social structure of the Republic shall be determined by the will of the nation freely expressed in a plebiscite to take place immediately after the conclusion of the war. The plebiscite shall be held with full guarantees and with no restrictions or limitations, ensuring those who participate in it against any possible reprisal.

  5. 5. Respect for regional liberties without prejudicing the unity of Spain …

  6. 6. The Spanish State will guarantee full civil and political rights, freedom of conscience, and the free exercise of religious beliefs and practices. [According to A. Lizarra (pseudonym for Andrés María de Irujo) this point was inspired by his (p.643) brother, Manuel de Irujo, a practicing Catholic and, at the time, Basque National minister without portfolio.2]

  7. 7. Within the limits imposed by the supreme interests of the nation, the State shall guarantee legally acquired property and the protection of the producers. Without reducing individual initiative, it shall prevent any accumulation of wealth that might lead to the exploitation of the citizen and the infringement of collective rights, endangering the State’s control over social and economic life. To this end, the State shall encourage the development of small business, guarantee family property and stimulate all measures conducive to moral, economic and racial improvement among the producing classes.

    The property and legitimate interests of those foreigners who have not aided the rebellion shall be respected, and the question of compensation for damages involuntarily caused during the war will be studied… .

  8. 8. Agrarian reform shall liquidate the old semifeudal aristocratic estates, which lack all human, national, and patriotic feeling and have always formed the major obstacle to the development of the country’s great possibilities. A new Spain based on a broad, solid democracy of the peasants, who shall be the owners of the land they till.

  9. 9. The State shall guarantee the rights of the worker by means of advanced social legislation in accordance with the specific needs of the life and economy of Spain.

  10. 10. Cultural, physical and moral improvement of the race will be the prime and basic concern of the State.

  11. 11. The Spanish army … shall be free from all hegemony by any party or tendency… .

  12. 12. The Spanish State reaffirms its constitutional doctrine renouncing war as an instrument of national policy… .

  13. 13. A broad amnesty for all Spaniards who wish to cooperate in the immense task of the reconstruction and aggrandizement of Spain… .3

Negrín’s mouthpiece, La Vanguardia, affirmed that the program would be put into effect “the very day the war ended.”4 The premier’s enthusiasm for the thirteen war aims, wrote Julián Zugazagoitia, “is almost delirious. He attaches the utmost importance to them and regards them as a valuable tool in Franco’s territory and abroad.”5 But if the promise of “pure democracy” and of an army “free from all hegemony by any party or tendency”—the two fundamental conditions on which a multiparty system depended—had any substance at all, there was little evidence in the conduct of the premier and defense minister and even less in the policies pursued by the PCE, as indicated in previous chapters. Even after the formal enunciation of the program, the PCE continued its drive for dominion over the armed forces and resumed its campaign in favor of a “Single Party of the Proletariat.” The single party, it asseverated on 13 May, would benefit “all tendencies, all the antifascist forces,” and no one could view it “with anything but extreme sympathy.” Communists and Socialists, it exhorted, should work (p.644) “with the utmost haste and intensity for a single membership card.”6 In the light of similar mergers—the JSU and PSUC—it cannot be overemphasized that if this amalgamation had been achieved, it would have been a giant stride toward the establishment of a single party state and rendered null and void the two basic points of the program pledging “pure democracy” and an army “free from all hegemony.”

The maximum publicity was given to the program at home and abroad. Foreign minister Alvarez del Vayo, at the next session of the League of Nations, laid special emphasis on the promise of the “free exercise of religious beliefs and practises,”7 which had been suppressed since the outbreak of the Revolution.8 In the succeeding months a number of reforms were introduced. On 25 June, Negrín restored religious practices in the land, sea, and air forces and ordered the chiefs of the three services to provide spiritual aid to those requesting it.9 On 17 October, for the first time since the outbreak of the Civil War, Barcelona witnessed the astonishing spectacle of a religious funeral procession in honor of a Basque captain making its way along the Gran Vía Diagonal with “raised cross,” “priests meticulously vested,” and with participants “chanting ritual responses.”10 The leading article in El Día Gráfico, written by Negrín’s press secretary Francisco Aguirre, stated: “The Catholic funeral held yesterday afternoon provided the military members controlling the withdrawal of foreign combatants with a moving spectacle.11 The respect that was shown will enable them, when their stay here is over, to take away with them a totally different impression of Spain than the one that has been given until recently, namely, a lamentable example of fanaticism and intolerance… . The funeral of the Basque hero, Vicente de Eguía Sagarduy, was a political event of enormous importance… . The Catholics, who are fighting on the side of the Republic, know that their right to express their religious beliefs enjoys today, as never before, … not only the protection of the government, but the respect of all citizens. If evidence of this has been lacking, it was proved yesterday and the news films will make it known to the world.”12 Finally, on 8 December, Negrín issued a decree setting up a “General Commissariat of Religion” in his own offices entrusted with all matters relating to religious activities.13 His mouthpiece, La Vanguardia, whose editorial comment was flanked on both sides by laudatory statements of such moderate politicians as the Basque Nationalist Julio Jáuregui and the Socialist Manuel Cordero, stressed the “guarantee of religious freedom” furnished by the decree and the effect on foreign countries, which would “discern the liberal spirit of the Republic.”14 To head the commissariat, Negrín appointed his friend and fellow physiologist, Dr. Bellido Golferich of the University of Barcelona.15 Whether or not Negrín would have reopened the churches in Barcelona cannot be said with certainty, for the city was occupied by General Franco only a few weeks later.

Meanwhile, the thirteen war aims became the programmatic frontispiece of the Negrín government. “The Thirteen Points,” wrote Louis Fischer, Negrín’s chief propaganda agent abroad, “… became the cardinal principles of the Republic. Negrín frequently referred to them in speeches. They were communicated (p.645) officially to foreign governments and pro-Loyalist propaganda abroad often took them as its text.”16

In a radio address aimed at foreign opinion and reported in the weekly propaganda bulletin The News of Spain, edited by Herbert R. Southworth, an unfaltering supporter of Negrín for fifty years,17 the prime minister declared: “We wish to assure the independence of Spain and the liberty of the Spanish people… . We want the legal aspects of the Spanish State within the bounds of tolerance, liberty and individual guarantees to be outlined by the Spanish people themselves through a plebiscite. We assure everyone that once the war is over there will be a full amnesty. We want a strong firm government of democratic origin … Our proposals are guaranteed by a government which has known how to restore order, create an army, … unify the people, defend its territory and which has been the first government in authority for many generations that has succeeded in linking its authority with the aspirations of the people.”18

Foreign fellow travelers, such as the celebrated German playwright and poet Ernst Toller, helped to disseminate the thirteen points abroad. In a broadcast to the United States from Radio Madrid, controlled by the PCE, he stressed that private property was protected. “You may own a shop, a department store. You may own a textile factory or a jeweler’s. Nobody will interfere with your work.”19 In the Volunteer for Liberty, the organ of the English-speaking battalions of the Communist-controlled International Brigades, a contest of articles was held on the merits of the declaration. “It is a dignified statement which must profoundly move all decent humane people throughout the world,” ran the winning article. “It will succeed in convincing many wavering elements both in Spain and abroad that the cause of the Republic is in capable hands and is bound to succeed… . All liberal-minded people—all who believe in human justice and freedom—must support these points and must recognise their own obligations, their duty to the Republic assailed by foreign invaders.”20 The thirteen-point program was also favorably and optimistically discussed by non-Communists, including some prominent leaders of Izquierda Republicana and Unión Republicana,21 and by distinguished foreign scholars.22

In view of the immense publicity received by the program, its genesis is worth noting. According to Louis Fischer, whose evidence is crucial in the matter, the program was inspired by Ivor Montagu, the British film producer, whom Fischer prudently avoids identifying as a member of the Communist party of Great Britain and as an editor of the London Daily Worker.23 “Throughout my stay in Barcelona,” he writes in the U.S. edition of Men and Politics, “I visited the Foreign Office every day, and every day I saw Ivor Montagu sitting in del Vayo’s antechamber still waiting for permission from the War Department to take moving pictures at the front… . Once he said to me, ‘You know, it seems to me that the Loyalist government ought to enunciate its war aims, a sort of Fourteen Points program like Woodrow Wilson’s.’ ‘Wonderful idea,’ I said, ‘why has it never occurred to anybody?’ I passed the idea on to del Vayo… . He talked to Negrín. Negrín said, ‘Fine, write them.’ Vayo drafted ten points and showed them to (p.646) Negrín. Negrín said, ‘We must have thirteen to show that we are not superstitious,’ and he added three himself.”24 Negrín’s frivolity says little for the genuineness of the entire program.

It is noteworthy that in the English edition of Louis Fischer’s book, all reference to Ivor Montagu—who since 1929 had been a prominent member of the British Communist party25—was omitted, and the thirteen-point episode was “touched up,” as Salvador de Madariaga puts it, to adapt to “English tastes.”26 “For some time,” ran the expurgated English version, “the Loyalist leaders had considered the advisability of announcing their social peace aims. They hoped they would undermine morale in Franco territory and reinforce sympathy for Loyalist Spain in foreign countries. Del Vayo and Negrín drafted most of the war aims and they were finally approved at a solemn session of the Cabinet.”27 Writes Alvarez del Vayo: “It was a Cabinet meeting which did credit to the Government and to the country, and which in itself gave the lie direct to all those who tried to represent loyalist Spain as a country dominated by foreign influence, demagogues, and revolutionaries.”28 And some years later the official Communist history of the Civil War affirmed: “The thirteen points demonstrated the falsity of the campaigns abroad that we were fighting for Communism, Socialism, or for an Anarchist regime in Spain and without democratic principles.”29

As though it had not been directly involved in the elaboration of the thirteen war aims, the PCE issued two weeks after their publication the following formal announcement: “The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party has examined the thirteen points and proclaims its agreement with them. The document corresponds with the character of the struggle of the Spanish people who are defending republican democracy and national independence and constitutes the foundation upon which all the antifascist forces of our country should unite… . We encourage all our comrades, all the combatants, and the entire antifascist people to continue working and fighting for a democratic Spain, in which the people enjoy to the full the rights that have always been denied them and in which they will achieve their aspirations of liberty, peace, justice, and social progress.”30

At the cabinet meeting of 30 April at which Negrín announced his program, there was only one hesitant voice. According to a circular issued the next day by the national committee of the CNT to the regional committees of the organization, Segundo Blanco, the lone CNT minister, suggested that the program be submitted to the various parties and organizations for prior approval, but Negrín objected for the following reasons: (1) It had to be published the same day and delivered to the British embassy. (2) Its object was to demonstrate abroad, “especially in France and England,” that there were “no extreme policies or any red danger” in Republican Spain. (3) If it were submitted to all the organizations “none would be in agreement with it, since it could not satisfy their respective doctrinal points of view.” Finally, Negrín pointed out that the declaration “should not be taken literally, because it was not something that would be applied in its entirety but rather a declaration that was timely and necessary for abroad.”31

(p.647) On 3 May, in a circular addressed to the regional committees of the FAI, the peninsular committee expressed its foreboding. There was no doubt, it said, that the program was designed to effect a change in international policy toward antifascist Spain, but it was also “the first openly acknowledged step” toward the liquidation of the Revolution. The fact that it had been announced by a government in which the CNT was represented raised “a very grave problem” of responsibility, since it would appear that the CNT had given “its consent to the renunciation of all the revolutionary conquests we have defended until now.” Then, in a more conciliatory tone, the peninsular committee added: “We accept the declaration as an inescapable fact, as something imposed by more powerful forces, which we cannot openly oppose lest we put ourselves in the position of causing a veritable catastrophe for antifascist Spain… . But in no way … do we lend ourselves to the game of the bourgeois and reformist groups who are using the international situation in order to blackmail the working class into renouncing its revolutionary gains. It would have been preferable had our revolutionary trade-union organization not shared responsibility for the declaration. Nevertheless, what it has done has avoided greater evils and is in accord with its representation in the government. The FAI, which is free from these commitments, should continue and can continue to be the vehicle for attaining Anarchism’s yearnings and aspirations.”32

This artful attempt to distance itself from the ideological transgressions of the CNT and to salvage its own historic responsibility, while condoning the CNT’s action in order not to exacerbate the dissensions within the libertarian movement, was not supported by the more radical elements; for, three days later, the peninsular committee issued another circular divorcing itself completely from the program: “From point 3, which establishes a parliamentary regime, to point 13, which promises amnesty to the supporters of Franco, the whole document clashes violently not only with our ideas … but with the reality of the situation created on 19 July [1936]… . We do not find in the text a formula that guarantees the conquests of the workers and peasants: the right to working-class control of production and to the collective cultivation of the soil. On the other hand, the State guarantees private property, private enterprise, the free exercise of religion, the development of small business, the compensation of foreign capital, etc., etc. It is difficult to conceive of a more counterrevolutionary program at this time.”33

On 19 May, the national committee of the CNT, controlled by the two outstanding moderates, Mariano Vázquez and Horacio M. Prieto, secretary and former secretary, respectively, tried to assuage the anxieties rampant in the libertarian movement. In a circular summarizing the reaction of the regional committees to the thirteen-point program, it stated: “[The] militants … intuitively see dangers, but at times some of the comrades exaggerate, … because the declaration contains much that is profitable.” It then explained each point in a positive manner as indicated by the following examples:

  1. (p.648) 1. To assure the absolute independence and complete integrity of Spain. This has been repeatedly affirmed by us since the 19th of July. If anybody should feel concern it should be the Communists since the document refers to a Spain “free from all foreign interference WHATEVER ITS NATURE AND ORIGIN.” …

  2. 6. The Spanish State will guarantee the free exercise of religious beliefs and practices. Is it possible to say anything else? It is essential to record our respect for religion, when we know the important role it plays especially in North America and England.

  3. 7. The State shall guarantee legally acquired property and shall encourage the development of small property. We would prefer to see a declaration in favor of socialization, collectivization, etc., but how can we forget that these issues are the “crux” of our problem abroad? Can we suddenly ignore the fact that neither England, nor France, nor America, nor any democracy can look kindly on or assist in the victory of a regime based on collectivization, socialization, or even nationalization by the workers? …

  4. 11. The Spanish army shall be free from all hegemony by any party or tendency. This is just a repetition of what we have been saying all along in face of the tactics and absorbing tendencies (absorcionismos) of the marxists.

“We have taken the document apart point by point,” the circular continued. “… It is not as counterrevolutionary as may appear at first sight. This we have demonstrated, but it is not the fundamental matter. The important thing is that it has been proclaimed at an opportune time for the benefit of foreign opinion… . In France, in North America, in England, it is a formidable tool in the hands of those who wish to help us. That is all. It has fulfilled its mission.”34

In spite of the massive publicity given to the program, it made no impression on the democratic powers. Horacio M. Prieto, the most influential and forceful member on the national committee of the CNT, who together with Mariano Vázquez was largely responsible for determining CNT policy and for the committee’s endorsement of the program, nonetheless brashly declared after the war: “Neither in the foreign offices nor in bourgeois circles abroad did anyone pay the slightest attention to the mendacious propaganda of our governments, which were the victims of a stupid naivety in trying to hide what was as clear as the light of day: On the one hand, the workers of the CNT carrying out sporadic attempts at socialization and, on the other hand, the marxists, lying in wait for the hour of victory in order to bolshevize Spain.”35

Nevertheless, until General Franco’s all-out offensive against Catalonia in December 1938, the hope still lingered among a significant segment of the Spanish left that Britain and France might reverse their policy and that the latent antagonisms between Germany and the Western democracies would erupt into a general European conflict that would save Republican Spain. For obvious diplomatic reasons, this hope could not be publicly acknowledged. Even after the collapse of the eastern front in the spring of 1938, when everything appeared to be fusing into disaster, La Pasionaria declared: “There are still people in our (p.649) country who cherish too many illusions regarding the international situation, and every day expect some extraordinary event that will suddenly change the European outlook and put an end to the invasion of our country. We do not share these naive illusions and warn everyone against them. [If] a European war should break out the fascists who are invading our soil would not hesitate to make use of the most barbarous weapons of destruction to crush our people in their eagerness to conquer Spain and gain control of the Mediterranean. We must not have any illusions that a European war would operate in our favor and bring the end of the war nearer.”36

Despite this asseveration, foreign minister Alvarez del Vayo, whose thoughts reflected the politburo’s expectations, made no secret in private conversation that he based his hopes on a European conflict. According to Azaña’s brother-in-law, Cipriano Rivas-Cherif, del Vayo “assured” José Giral that war was imminent and that it would have “a favorable and decisive influence on our fate,”37 while Elya Ehrenburg, the Soviet journalist and writer, recalls that the foreign minister assured him in the summer of 1938 that “war between Germany on the one hand and France with her allies on the other was inevitable.”38

This of course was the hope of Joseph Stalin and the personal conviction of Juan Negrín, the symbol of the resistance policy, who, according to Herbert Matthews, a friend and enduring admirer of the premier, “realized that if he could only hold out long enough the greater conflict would come along and save Republican Spain.”39


(1.) 14 May 1938.

(2.) Los vascos y la república española, 209. The author was secretary to his brother, Manuel.

(3.) La Vanguardia, 1 May 1938. My italics.

(4.) Ibid.

(6.) Mundo Obrero, 14 May 1938.

(8.) For an account of the clandestine religious activities in Catalonia during the war, see Albert Manent i Segimon and Josep Raventós i Giralt, L’església clandestina a Catalunya durant la guerra civil, 1936–1939.

(9.) Gaceta de la República, 26 June 1938.

(10.) Ricardo del Río, director of the Febus news agency. File “Ricardo del Río: Information on various important events written by Del Río and shorthand notes taken by Burnett Bolloten during conversations with him” (Hoover Institution).

(11.) For information on the withdrawal of foreign volunteers, which was conducted under the supervision of the League of Nations, see Chapter 62.

(13.) Gaceta de la República, 9 Dec. 1938.

(14.) 15 Dec. 1938. See also ibid., 9, 17 Dec. 1938. For Communist press comments on the decree creating the commissariat, see Frente Rojo, 16 Dec. 1938.

(15.) File “Ricardo del Río: Information on various important events” (Hoover Institution).

(17.) “In order to understand Southworth’s steadfastly loyal and therefore uncritical support of Negrín,” writes George Esenwein, “one must bear in mind that he served as an important propagandist for the Negrín government. Between February 1938 and February 1939, he edited The News of Spain, published by the Spanish Information Bureau, New York (see Contemporary Authors, vols. 85–88, p. 557), a bulletin which, if not financed by or otherwise officially associated with the Spanish Republican government, was unmistakeably a mouthpiece for its policies. Several themes recur which identify it as such. 1. News of events in Spain is focused on the achievements of the Negrín administration. Thus, the opening of a church was cited as an example of the government’s commitment (p.917) to religious tolerance. 2. Other events, no matter how controversial, were always presented as somehow reflecting the positive aspects of the Negrín government. An example of this is found in the bulletin’s report of the POUM trial in October 1938. Using information derived from reporters like Herbert Matthews or other sources either sympathetic or close to Negrín, the bulletin attempted to portray the trial as a model of ‘Republican justice.’ The ‘facts’ of the case are all given from this point of view and are therefore heavily weighted against the POUM defendants. For instance, although the bulletin does not openly assert that the POUMists on trial were traitors, this is clearly implied. Accordingly, rumor, circulated by the Communists, who were responsible for staging the trial, are repeated without qualification, e.g., that Andrés Nin and Juan Rovira, the political secretary of the party and the former commander of the Twenty-ninth division respectively, had taken refuge in ‘Rebel territory’ (2 November 1938). 3. Finally, the Republican figures who received most attention (in the form of biographical sketches and the like) were pro-Communists associated with Negrín, such as Vicente Rojo, Alvarez del Vayo and José Bergamín, the Catholic writer, who was personally involved in goodwill campaigns abroad on behalf of the Negrín government. [This is a good example of what Luis Araquistáin was referring to when he wrote in the New York Times on 25 May 1939 that “the propaganda carried out abroad only sang the praises of Dr. Negrín, Señor Alvarez del Vayo, and the Communists.”] Foreign personalities who were also Negrinistas and frequently appeared in the bulletin’s columns were Herbert Matthews, Louis Fischer, Gustav Regler and Frank Jellinek. It is interesting to note that Southworth has not discussed the role he played as editor of The News of Spain. When interviewed about the Civil War in Tiempo de Historia (October 1978), he did not allude to the fact that he was a propagandist for the Negrín government, but he did describe the Premier as ‘the most outstanding personality in the Republican camp during the war’ and argued that the time had come to reassess his achievements as a political figure.” This account, which is reproduced in a previous chapter, is based on a careful analysis of The News of Spain collection, and was prepared specifically for me by George Esenwein in 1984. It is worth recording that after the death of General Franco in 1975, Southworth appeared prominently on Spanish TV as a leading authority on the Spanish Civil War, of which he gave his own particular version to viewers, most of whom, because of their age, had little knowledge of the complexities of the Civil War.

(18.) 26 October 1938.

(19.) New Statesman and Nation, 8 Oct. 1938.

(20.) 30 June 1938. See also issue of 7 July 1938.

(21.) See, for example, Diego Martínez Barrio in La Vanguardia, 29 May 1938, and Miguel San Andrés in Política, 11 May and 8 June 1938.

(22.) For example, William C. Atkinson in Fortnightly Review, Jan. 1939.

(23.) Who’s Who, 1973–1974, 2268, includes the following biographical data: Born 23 April 1904, third son of 2d Baron Swaythling; film critic, editor, director, writer, producer from 1925; editorial staff Daily Worker, 1932–33 and 1937–47; member of the Secretariat and Bureau of the World Council of Peace, 1948–67; Lenin Peace Prize, 1959.

(25.) See interview with Montagu in Screen, Autumn 1972.

(30.) Mundo Obrero, 16 May 1938.

(31.) Document 59 of the Rocker Collection (“Posición de la FAI ante la Declaración del Gobierno de ‘Los Trece Puntos’”), Circular No. 9, dated 1 May 1938.

(32.) Ibid., Circular No. 17, dated 3 May 1938.

(33.) Ibid., Circular No. 18, dated 6 May 1938.

(34.) Ibid., Circular No. 12, dated 10 May 1938.

(36.) Dolores Ibárruri, En la lucha, 277 (from her report at the plenum of the central committee of the PCE, held in Madrid from 23 to 25 May 1938).

(37.) Retrato de un desconocido: Vida de Manuel Azaña, 293.

(39.) The Yoke and the Arrows, 40. In June 1938, Azaña, when interviewed by Ehrenburg, said: “Negrín seems to believe that a world war would save Spain. There will certainly be a war. But they won’t start it before they have throttled Spain” (Ehrenburg, Eve of War, 1933–1941, 209). See also Heleno Saña’s interview with Santiago Garcés Arroyo in Indice, 15 June 1974.